Dialogues, vol. 4 - Parmenides, Theaetetus, Sophist, Statesman, Philebus by Plato

Author:Plato
Language: eng
Format: mobi, epub
Publisher: Liberty Fund, Inc.
Published: 2010-09-07T23:00:00+00:00

then being has a centre and extremes, and, having these, must also have parts.

Theaet.

True.

Str.

245Yet that which has parts may have the attribute of unity in all the parts, and in this way being all and a whole, may be one?

Theaet.

Certainly.

Str.

But that of which this is the condition cannot be absolute unity?

Theaet.

Why not?

Str.

Because, according to right reason, that which is truly one must be affirmed to be absolutely indivisible.

Theaet.

Certainly.

Str.

But this indivisible, if made up of many parts, will contradict reason.

Theaet.

I understand.

Str.

Is being, then, one by participation in unity, or is it not a whole?

Shall we say that being is one and a whole, because it has the attribute of unity? Or shall we say that being is not a whole at all?

Theaet.

That is a hard alternative to offer.

Str.

In either case we have to admit plurality.

Most true; for being, having in a certain sense the attribute of one, is yet proved not to be the same as one, and the all is therefore more than one.

Theaet.

Yes.

Str.

And yet if being be not a whole, through having the attribute of unity, and there be such a thing as an absolute whole, being lacks something of its own nature?

Theaet.

Certainly.

Str.

Upon this view, again, being, having a defect of being, will become not-being?

Theaet.

True.

Str.

And, again, the all becomes more than one, for being and the whole will each have their separate nature.

Theaet.

Yes.

Str.

And if the whole does not exist at all, being cannot have come into being;

But if the whole does not exist at all, all the previous difficulties remain the same, and there will be the further difficulty, that besides having no being, being can never have come into being.

Theaet.

Why so?

Str.

for everything which comes into being, comes into being as a whole.

Because that which comes into being always comes into being as a whole, so that he who does not give whole a place among beings, cannot speak either of essence or generation as existing.

Theaet.

Yes, that certainly appears to be true.

Str.

Again; how can that which is not a whole have any quantity? For that which is of a certain quantity must necessarily be the whole of that quantity.

Theaet.

Nor can it partake of quantity.

Exactly.

Str.

And there will be innumerable other points, each of them causing infinite trouble to him who says that being is either one or two.

Theaet.

The difficulties which are dawning upon us prove this; for one objection connects with another, and they are always involving what has preceded in a greater and worse perplexity.

Str.

We are far from having exhausted the more exact thinkers who treat of being and not-being. But let us be content to leave them, and proceed to view those who speak less precisely; and we shall find as the result of all, that the 246nature of being is quite as difficult to comprehend as that of not-being.

Theaet.

Then now we will go to the others.

Str.

There appears to be a sort of war of Giants and Gods going on amongst them; they are fighting with one another about the nature of essence.

Theaet.

How is that?

Str.

Let us now ask the Materialists and Idealists to give an account of essence.

Download

Copyright Disclaimer:
This site does not store any files on its server. We only index and link to content provided by other sites. Please contact the content providers to delete copyright contents if any and email us, we'll remove relevant links or contents immediately.